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Preface
A group of experts associated with the Economists for Peace and
Security and the Initiative for Rethinking the Economy met recently
in Paris to discuss financial and monetary issues. Senior Scholar
James K. Galbraith summarizes the group’s viewpoints, which are
largely at odds with the global political and economic establish-
ment. Despite some success in averting a catastrophic collapse of
liquidity and a decline in output, the group was pessimistic that
there would be sustained economic recovery and a return of high
employment. There was general consensus among the group that
the precrisis financial system should not be restored, that reviving
the financial sector first was not the way to revive the economy, and
that governments should not pursue exit strategies that permit a
return to the status quo. Rather, the crisis exposes the need for pro-
found reform to meet a range of physical and social objectives. 
The group’s outlook was based on the belief that the influence
of private equity on global investment patterns will not return, and
that the growth of rich-country consumer debt will not be restored.
Moreover, there is no region outside the United States that is pre-
pared to step up and play the role of consumer of last resort, and no
offset to the global demand for savings. Thus, the world economy
will not grow its way out of depression and unemployment with-
out major and sustained public inititative. 
Neoliberal reform and neoclassical economics have veered
away from general welfare by substituting the market for the func-
tions of the state. The concept of public interest disappears from
theory, and markets, by definition, serve only private interests; that
is, an alliance of the rich against the middle class and the poor. The
slippage from liberal to neoliberal thinking has been especially clear
in banking and is present in the U.S. administration’s response to
the crisis. Fundamental reform and “bottom up” recovery strate-
gies are blocked by preserving the existing (unstable) system and by
failing to prosecute fraud. The group favors a major strengthening
of national and transnational regulatory agencies, including rules
for citizens dealing with such agencies (e.g., rules of taxation and for
mortgages); aligning the reach of banks with the regulatory frame-
work, and government enforcement (i.e., public power). Moreover,
there is merit in achieving (smaller) public-purpose financial struc-
tures that are not “too big to fail.”
There was broad agreement that a mixed financial system, with
liberal (public-private) institutional underpinnings and a market
context, requires regulation of both institutional conduct and gov-
ernance, as well as market instruments. In this context, the reform
packages in both the United States and Europe fall short. And there
is no particular need for the U.S. Treasury to establish separate enti-
ties as receptacles for toxic assets, and no excuse for the government
to fail to redefine and set economic accounting standards for the
conduct of banks, or to fully employ human potential.
The design of economic policy has delegated environmen-
tal, health, and inequality indicators to secondary roles in favor
of the monetarist goal that ties central bank conduct to the drive
for price stability. A preferred alternative is to design policy that
focuses on global public goods, nonrenewable resources, human
resource use, and the sharing of knowledge goods. The correct
approach to increase economic activity and employment includes
a program of general fiscal assistance or revenue sharing, relief from
payroll taxes, and expanded Social Security benefits. Moreover, a
public job at a fixed wage for all takers functions like a buffer
stock for human labor, stabilizing both total employment and
the bottom tier of the wage structure.  
According to the group, the historic justifications for a dollar-
based system are no longer persuasive, and present international
monetary institutions are weak and dysfunctional (e.g., the
International Monetary Fund is, essentially, beyond repair). The
group favors the development of regional monetary authorities
and freeing developing countries from a compulsive need to serve
the export sector on any terms. They note that the problem of
unemployment is easily cured without threat to profitability or as
a source of inflation, and that the problem of liquidity can be
solved only at the level of the currency unit. In sum, the group
warns that the crisis is not over, that policies set in motion are not
sufficient, and that the goals set by the authorities are neither desir-
able nor possible. 
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President 
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Financial and Monetary Issues as the
Crisis Unfolds
Introduction
On June 15 and 16, 2009, the working group on financial and
monetary issues of Economists for Peace and Security (EPS) and
the Initiative for Rethinking the Economy (IRE) met in Paris for
a closed discussion of the ongoing crisis and resulting reform
proposals, including the new initiatives of the G-20 and the
Obama administration.1 This brief provides a structured sum-
mary of the major points of those meetings. It reflects in general
terms the center of gravity of the views expressed, drawing on
the expertise and careful reflection of the specialists and experts
who were there.
Nevertheless, it is written on my personal responsibility,
with only limited attribution to particular persons and the spe-
cific consent of none. The authority of this particular group was
established in June 2008, when it met and thereafter issued one
of the first comprehensive warnings about the impending (global)
financial collapse. That warning helped to place several mem-
bers of the group in position to influence the legislative discus-
sion of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and to the
fiscal expansion package in the United States, and to the devel-
opment of the G-20 position in early 2009.
State of Play
As the group met, prominent voices, including Chancellor
Merkel of Germany and other leaders of the European Union
(EU), were preparing to issue statements declaring the world eco-
nomic crisis substantially resolved, and urging a shift in focus to
“exit strategies” aimed mainly at fiscal deficit reduction. The Paris
group took a very different view. 
Participants recognized that emergency action and auto-
matic stabilization had worked, in the most violent phase of the
crisis, to avert a catastrophic collapse of liquidity in the world
system, and to place a floor under the decline of output in the
more advanced countries. They recognized the favorable impact
of fiscal expansion policies undertaken in the United States and
China, and the likely positive effects of an end to inventory liq-
uidation in the months ahead.
Yet all of this falls far short of creating conditions for sus-
tained economic recovery and a return to high employment. On
this crucial question, members of the Paris group were strikingly
pessimistic—a pessimism shared despite a wide range of under-
lying theoretical perspectives.
One speaker summarized the general position as a
“Minskyan supercycle” —a crisis of underconsumption and
overproduction occasioned on one side by a vast overhang of
private debts, which households would like to get rid of but
largely cannot; and on the other by the unwillingness of govern-
ments to allow major corporations and (especially) banks to dis-
appear—a step that would be necessary to adjust supply, and
therefore profitability, to demand. Not incidental to this is an
undoing of globalization, caused by the collapse of trade finance,
revealing the fragility of the previous world economic structures
and the weakness of existing economic institutions—global,
regional, and national.
A second speaker invoked the metaphor of the eye of a hur-
ricane. The first wall of the storm has passed over us: the col-
lapse of the banking system, which engendered panic and a
massive public sector rescue effort. At rest in the eye, we face the
second: the bankruptcy of states, provinces, cities, and even some
national governments, from California, USA, to Belgium. Since
this is a slower process involving weaker players, complicated
questions of politics, fairness, and solidarity, and more diffused
system risk, there is no assurance that the response by capable
actors at the national or transnational level will be either timely
or sufficient, either in the United States or in Europe.
A still larger issue concerns the backdrop of the Kondratieff
cycle: the long waves of technical change that generally underlie
major economic depressions. In the slump, governments come
under pressure to save fading or dying industries, such as auto-
mobiles—an industry based on a 19th-century combustion engine
and the eternal promise of cheap oil. Meanwhile, they fail to put
adequate resources behind the sectors whose growth is most
promising—notably, sustainable energy, greenhouse gas reduc-
tions, and public health. In these matters, organized politics and
rational foresight stand at cross-purposes, and the cause of eco-
nomic recovery is not served.
Speaking from a Kaldorian perspective, one participant
asked whether it is possible to return to the structures of eco-
nomic growth that had developed worldwide in the decade
before the crash. This was, practically for the first time since the
Bretton Woods era, a time of worldwide expansion, includingThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 5
Latin America, Africa, and all of Asia. It was based on high pro-
ductivity growth, low inflation, and profitability higher even than
in the 1950s and 1960s, with real wages rising in the developing
countries but not in the developed regions, and therefore a decline
in global pay inequalities between nations. But a global expan-
sion produced a global crisis, as private equity promoted out-
sourcing, globalizing production, and the United States provided
deficit financing that sustained worldwide demand. Meanwhile,
commodity prices rose, improving terms of trade for develop-
ing countries, largely due to the rise of speculative purchasing
through commodity funds. There was in addition a massive flow
of foreign direct investment into oil and biofuels, which led to a
buildup of foreign exchange reserves (mostly in dollars), while
the normal exchange rate adjustment mechanisms were blocked.
The question now posed is, How much of this system can be
saved? In simple terms, the influence of private equity on global
investment patterns will not return. Nor will the growth of rich-
country consumer debt be restored. The one enduring compo-
nent of the old global system is commodity speculation, meaning
that a rise in demand (if it occurs) is likely to be reflected quite
quickly in higher energy prices. But getting adequate demand
into the world system remains a critical problem. If it does not
come from the United States, where will it come from? At the
world level, there is no effective alternative mechanism to offset
the desire for savings and its depressing effect on total demand.
One way to think about this issue is to consider the power of
the locomotive in relation to the length of the train. As the world
economy has grown larger over time, in relation to the U.S. econ-
omy, the train becomes larger in relation to the locomotive. Thus,
the scale of demand provided to the world system by the coun-
try supplying the reserve currency declines. To maintain world
demand, either the United States must provide an ever-larger
current account deficit in relation to U.S. GDP (running the
engine hotter), or else some other major player must move into
a substantial current account deficit to play a similar role (adding
a locomotive). Failing either of these options, there is no offset to
the global desire for savings, and the world economy cannot
grow its way out of depression and unemployment. The train
slows, and some of the cars will perforce be abandoned.
Therefore, the problem is in part that there is no major
region outside the United States that is prepared to step up and
play the role of consumer of last resort. In particular, Europe is
failing to play this role, and the European participants in the con-
ference gave exceptionally harsh assessments, especially of the
German and French governments at the heart of the euro sys-
tem. One said that they “do not understand the world crisis” but
remain fixed on an agenda of “destroying the state and cutting
public services” in a futile effort to control budget deficits.
Meanwhile, parts of Eastern Europe are approaching collapse,
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) demanding severe
cuts in public spending in Latvia, Estonia, and Moldova, with
public order to be maintained by force, if necessary. The decline
in Eastern and Central Europe resembles the subprime crisis in
the United States, absent the element of fraud: as falling currency
values place mortgages denominated in euros or Swiss francs
under stress, the highly leveraged banking systems in Western
Europe come under more pressure. Hungary and Ukraine pose
significant dangers in this regard.
American participants were almost equally skeptical of the
effectiveness of the U.S. approach to date. As one put it, “Diabetes
is a metabolic disease.” Elements of a metabolic disease can be
treated (here, “stimulus” plays the role of insulin), but the key to
success is to deal with the underlying metabolic problem. In the
economic sphere, that problem lies essentially with the transfer
of resources and power to the top and the dismantling of effec-
tive taxing power over those at the top of the system. (The
speaker noted that the effective corporate tax rate for the top 20
firms in the United States is under 2 percent.) The effect of this
is to create a “trained professional class of retainers” who devote
themselves to preserving the existing (unstable) system. Further,
there were massive frauds in the origination of mortgages, in the
ratings processes that led to securitization, and in the credit
default swaps that were supposed to insure against loss. In the
policy approach so far, there is a consistent failure to address,
analyze, remedy, and prosecute these frauds.
Fundamental reform and “bottom-up” recovery strategies
based on social insurance and public investment are therefore
blocked from the outset. President Obama has his equivalents of
Lewis Douglas, the conservative budget director under FDR, but
no one to play the roles of Harry Hopkins, Harold Ickes, and
Frances Perkins—the architects of the New Deal employment
policy, of public works and improved labor conditions. Meanwhile,
major legislation from health care to bank reform continues to
be written in consultation with the lobbies; as one speaker noted,
legislation on credit default swaps was being prepared by “Jamie
Dimon and his lobbyists.”2
One of the gravest dangers to economic recovery, finally, lies
precisely in the crisis-fatigue of the political classes, in their lackPublic Policy Brief, No. 103 6
practice, that banks have responsibilities as well as rights, and
that the state has power over the conduct of banks, including the
power and the duty to take them over and run them when they
are troubled enough to threaten the public guarantee that lies
behind bank deposits.
“Financial markets,” on the other hand, and especially the
“shadow banking system” of modern times, are neoliberal cre-
ations: they exist to place in the domain of private market trans-
actions what previously existed in a clearly defined relationship
to public purpose. They escape both regulation and insurance.
The result has been to vitiate the concept of public purpose, creat-
ing in banks privileged and powerful market-oriented institutions
that use and largely control the state rather than respond to it.
The Geithner-Summers plan recognizes the deficiencies of
the financial market system, including the shadow banking sys-
tem. It strongly acknowledges the need for comprehensive reform.
Certain of the specific proposals in the plan, especially that for a
“Consumer Financial Safety Commission” with broad powers to
oversee the financial products offered to consumers, are prom-
ising. Equally promising is the push to bring over-the-counter
derivatives under control and to institute clearinghouses, imply-
ing obligatory standardization of contracts.
The fact that these proposals are engendering opposition
from the bank lobbies is a marker of their merit. Nevertheless,
the U.S. administration’s approach remains anchored in a neolib-
eral vision of financial markets and not in the older, liberal vision
of banking institutions. In this respect, it does not depart from
the Basel II emphasis on capital requirements and transparency,
as formulae to provide a margin of safety and assurance of hon-
esty—in what is otherwise accepted as properly a sphere for the
market rather than for the state. This remains, likewise, substan-
tially (though not entirely) the approach of the European regu-
latory authorities.
The difficulty and deficiencies of this way of thinking are
twofold. First, one cannot escape institutional history. Banks are
creatures of the state, subject to state deposit insurance and pru-
dential regulation. This reality cannot be overturned or neglected
without exposing the state to uncontrollable financial losses. The
attempt in the neoliberal era to escape from deposit insurance
by allowing it to wither away (by declining to increase insurance
limits as the economy grew) proved completely unworkable, as
British authorities discovered with Northern Rock, as thePaulson
Treasury realized with the enactment of TARP, and as the Irish
and, later, all the European authorities realized as the crisis
of patience with a deep and intractable problem, and with their
inflexible commitment to the preceding economic order. This
feeds denial of the problem, a deep desire to move back to famil-
iar rhetorical and political ground, and the urge to declare vic-
tory, groundlessly and prematurely. As one speaker argued, the
U.S. discussion of “green shoots” amounts to little more than
politically inspired wishful thinking—a substitute for action, at
least so far as hopes for the recovery of employment are con-
cerned. The talk among European leaders of “exit strategies” also
perfectly illustrates this phenomenon.
A General Framework: Liberal and Neoliberal Reform
All agree that the financial system needs “reform.” And the pro-
gram of the Obama administration, prefigured by a June 15
Washington Post op-ed by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner
and top economic adviser Lawrence Summers, emphasizes what
is plainly true: the crisis arose from failures of regulation, and
the remedies will require fundamental change. The question is,
What changes count as fundamental?
Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira provided a framework for think-
ing about this question in historical context, distinguishing
between “liberal” and “neoliberal” reform. Liberalism, he argued,
was a doctrine of the 18th-century middle class, which was then
rising against an oppressive state, then dominated by landown-
ers and the military. The liberal state that then emerged was by
turns republican, democratic, progressive, Keynesian, and social
democratic—which is to say, ever more deeply concerned with
the general welfare and ever more willing to take responsibility
for it. Neoliberalism, in political terms, appropriated the sym-
bols of the liberal revolution (notably, Adam Smith), in a new
alliance of the rich against the middle class and the poor.
In neoclassical economics (the metatheory of neoliberal-
ism), the market comes to substitute for the functions of the
state. But without the state, the concept of the public interest dis-
appears from the theory. Markets, by definition, serve only pri-
vate interests. And the project of neoliberal reform becomes one
of making the markets serve private interests more completely
or more efficiently, rather than the attempt to define and serve
the broader public interest.
The slippage from liberal to neoliberal thinking occurs in
every domain of economic discourse, and it is especially clear in
banking. Banks are institutions, chartered by public authority,
to serve public purpose. It is clearly understood, in law and inThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 7
spread. Deposit insurance is the one proven antidote to panic,
and it entails a need for in-depth prudential regulation, not just
of the markets but of the institutions themselves.
Second, even if one accepted the neoliberal vision of market
discipline, the doctrine of “too big to fail” completely perverts it.
An institution that is too big to fail has the implicit support of the
state, and therefore a crushing weight of market power, com-
pared to all competing institutions. The result of combining too-
big-to-fail with neoliberalism is perverse in every way, facilitating
and even encouraging dysfunctional risk taking and excessive
compensation—incentives for fraud. And when the system
crumbles, the perversity redoubles, as in the panic ordinary bank
depositors flee from the institutions that are not too big to fail to
those that are. No principle of market discipline can work under
these conditions; on the contrary, destabilizing and dangerous
behavior is actually rewarded.
The Paris group held differing opinions on the proper res-
olution of this dilemma. Some would favor, in principle, a com-
plete return to the liberal vision, including suppression of the
shadow financial system, strict limits on securitization, and a ban
on credit default swaps. Others favored a return to a Glass-
Steagall separation of functions. Still others took the view that
history and evolution cannot be easily unraveled, and that one
must therefore learn to live with financial market practices,
including innovation and regulatory arbitrage—up to a point.
What one participant (a banker) described as “two worlds”—
traditional banking and market players—within banks may, to
speak realistically, endure. But the group was in broad agreement
that a mixed system, with liberal (public-private) institutional
underpinnings and a market context, requires regulation of both
features: regulation of institutional conduct and governance as
well as regulation of the market instruments. And it is in this
respect that the reform packages so far seen, both in the United
States and in Europe, fall short.
As one participant put it, the United States already has some
7,000 public-private financial partnerships. They are called
“banks;” with a capital requirement of 10 percent and insurance
(either deposit insurance or ad hoc guarantees) on the rest of
their liabilities they are, in effect, 90-10 public-private. There was,
and is, no particular need for the U.S. Treasury to attempt (so
far, without success) to establish separate entities as receptacles
for toxic assets.
There is also no excuse for the government to fail to set the
standards it deems appropriate for the conduct of the existing
banks. This includes rules for compensation of executives, for
the origination (and, at present, renegotiation) of loans, for
underwriting of loan-backed securities, and for insurance against
risk. Regulators can and should prevent the kind of subprime
debacle that just occurred (in the United States they did so in
1990–91). Bankers who do not wish to serve public purpose in
this way should not be in the industry.
The Larger Context for Reform: To What End?
Ultimately, the financial system is a means, not an end. It is not
justified by its own existence.
Banks are not common property or national mascots, whose
growth and profitability are per sematters of pride. They are there
to serve public and social purpose. The question then becomes,
What are the larger purposes that economic policy in general, and
financial policy in particular, should address?
This question is always present, but it takes on particular
significance at a moment of crisis, when a metastable system,
previously driven largely by its own inertia, breaks down. This
has happened. It should not be the goal of financial policy to
restore the previous system, which had no particular sense of
direction, no alignment with public purpose, no intrinsic stabil-
ity or other grand justification. A difficulty of regulatory reform
lies in the underlying desire, sometimes unstated, to return to
the previously existing system, without asking whether that sys-
tem meets social needs and public purpose looking forward.
The purposes of economic policy are tied up with the
accounting frameworks in predominant use, and these have spe-
cific historical origins and contexts. National income accounts
place the emphasis on economic growth; they originated in the
Depression and during World War II helped guide the mobiliza-
tion of war production. Unemployment statistics, which go back
to the 19th century but became timely indices of well-being only
in the postwar years, place their emphasis on the performance
of the job market. The reporting framework for central banks,
developed in the 1970s, was strongly influenced by the mone-
tarist goal of tying central bank conduct to the drive for price
stability. Environmental, health, and inequality indicators tend to
be added on to these as ancillary measures of social progress or
regress, and they therefore tend to play secondary roles in the
design of economic policy.
The crisis exposes the need for profound reform, not only in
the way we do economic policy but also in the way we measurePublic Policy Brief, No. 103 8
highest accounting level. Thus, an activity should be accounted
positively if it reduces greenhouse gas emissions and not if oth-
erwise. This by itself would induce tax and regulatory revisions
that could cause a major reevaluation of industrial activity—
movement toward sustainable technologies and away fromdestruc-
tive ones. Similarly, an international framework incorporating
principles of distributive justice would tend to penalize the waste
of nonrenewable resources, especially by richer countries, while
rewarding a shift toward conservation and renewable energy.
At the same time, to make life under a sustainable regime
supportable, it is essential that the human experience not be
degraded—that, in fact, it should actually improve. The key to
this is to recognize that there is no operational limit on either
the spread of knowledge or the use of human talent. A critical
function of government is to ensure that education, research, and
scientific development reach their full potential, and also that
the resulting human potential is fully employed. Achieving the
latter, in a sustainable way, in turn requires dealing with the
unsustainable ecological consequences of conventional growth,
and with the destabilization that will occur if commodity mar-
kets are left to unregulated market forces.
For many years, economists and others have deplored the
use of GDP as a catchall indicator of economic welfare, and its
deficiencies, including the neglect of environmental conse-
quences and indifference to distribution, are well known. But the
usual alternatives, whether to measure “human development” or
to incorporate an inequality measure alongside a growth meas-
ure (the Sen approach) suffer from the arbitrariness common to
the creation of all index numbers. If one changes the weights
attributed to various factors, the index changes; yet there is no
objective or standard criterion for deciding on the weights best
attributed to each factor.
The Calame approach of multiple indicators suggests a way
out of this dilemma, at the price of admitting that economic
change is often ambiguous in its effect on welfare. Consider a set
of indicators for progress or regress with respect to each class of
goods considered separately.
Clearly, events that move all four classes in a favorable direc-
tion are unambiguously to be preferred. Clearly, events that move
all four in an unfavorable direction are unambiguously to be
avoided. All other events are ambiguous, and the task of policy
design is to fire correctly on as many of the four cylinders—
global public goods, nonrenewable resources, human resource
use, and the production and sharing of knowledge goods—as
the outcomes. As Pierre Calame put it to the group in stark
terms: the system as we have it “has the same brake and acceler-
ator”—that which produces growth is also producing climate
change and the prospect for a cataclysmic end to modern human
experience. Economic accounts are not designed to deal with this,
and the result is a schizophrenic approach to policy. We have an
economic counting scheme that celebrates all resource-using activ-
ity as growth while remaining suspicious of the full use of human
resources, counting “full employment” as a potential threat to prof-
itability and as a source of inflation. This is exactly the reverse of
the system of relative values that we know to be needed.
Calame placed before the group a series of principles for an
accounting framework that could lead toward a sustainable system.
These involved distinguishing between four basic classes of goods:
Those “that are destroyed when shared”—the historical
tragedy of the commons, and in our time, most press-
ingly, the planet itself. This domain requires the imposi-
tion of common regulation, with the goal of preserving
the balance between human activity and nature.
Those “that are divided, when shared, in fixed quanti-
ties”—the case of nonrenewable resources, for which
the use by some precludes the use by others. These
require an accountingframework based in part on prin-
ciples of justice. Purchasing power at a given moment is
not an adequate justification for the using up of
resources that, when used, are gone for all time.
Those “that are divided, when shared, but reproducible.”
These, like common services and artistic endeavor, are
mainly the product of human energy and skill. They are
the proper domain of the market and of conventional
national income accounting, whose purpose is to assure
the full utilization of human resources.
Those “that are multiplied when shared.” These are pri-
marily the fruits of new knowledge, whose production
society should encourage (by maximum emphasis on
education and research), and whose wide distribution
per se serves public purpose and social welfare.
The Calame framework clearly suggests that the world com-
munity should press toward a redefinition of economic account-
ing standards aimed at placing planetary sustainability on theThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
possible. The task of economic statistics then becomes to define
measures in each of these areas that permits one to say, with
some confidence, whether the movement is, or is not, in the cor-
rect direction.
Would that we had an effective program for reform of sta-
tistical practices along these lines.
An immediate implication of this approach is that one can-
not hope to direct sensible economic reform through the bank-
ing sector, because banks’ distorted accounting structures distort
their behavior. This has been the pattern of the past generation.
With the financial sector in the lead, economic growth has
become an ambiguous exercise, fostering manic and unstable
overinvestment (in technology, in housing, and, finally, in oil),
rapidly increasing economic inequality, and a complete lack of
progress on the environmental front. Meanwhile, periodic gains
in employment are wiped out in the subsequent crash. The task
of reform is to find another way—a way to set the direction of
growth along lines that meet a range of important physical and
social objectives. As one participant put it, it’s not just that the car
has a single pedal for accelerator and brake; it’s also that it lacks
a steering wheel.
As a general proposition, the group also strongly agreed that
efforts to revive the economy by first reviving the financial sec-
tor cannot work. The correct approach to increase the level of
economic activity and employment should instead consist of
measures run through the public sector, the household sector,
and the business sector. Thus, a program of general fiscal assis-
tance—revenue sharing, in American terms—is the right way to
stabilize the finances of state governments in the United States
and of national governments in Europe. Relief from taxes on
employment—payroll taxes—is an effective and relatively pro-
gressive way to stabilize household finances and, indirectly, to
help the financial sector by giving households the capacity to
meet their financial commitments. Expanding Social Security
benefits, as well as unemployment insurance, food stamps, and
other direct payments to individuals, is a proven and effective
way to strengthen the incomes of dependent populations, par-
ticularly the elderly. Foreclosure relief and conversions-to-rental
can help reinforce the housing sector by keeping people, as much
as possible, in their homes.
Warren Mosler picked up on the theme of human resource
utilization and full employment in a particularly useful way.
Mosler suggested that stabilization of employment and prices is
akin to a buffer stock—something to which surpluses can be
added when demand is low, and drawn down when it is high.
Normally, a buffer stock works on a price signal: the authorities
agree to buy when market prices are below the buffer and to sell
when they are above. In this way, prices stabilize at the buffer
price. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is potentially a good
example, though political decisions have prevented it from being
used as it should be.
The problem with most commodity buffers is elasticity of
supply: create a buffer stock in wool, and suddenly it pays to raise
sheep. But this problem is cured if the buffer stock is human
labor, which cannot be reproduced quickly. A program that pro-
vides a public job at a fixed wage for all takers functions exactly
like a buffer stock, stabilizing both total employment and the
bottom tier of the wage structure. People can move in and out of
the buffer as private demand for their services varies. Meanwhile,
the work done in the buffer—the fact that people are working
rather than receiving unemployment insurance—helps keep the
buffer “fresh.” Private employers like hiring those who already
work, and will prefer hiring from the federal jobs program rather
than from among those who remain unemployed.
The point is: the problem of unemployment is easily cured,
without threat of inflation. It is merely sufficient to provide jobs,
at a fixed wage, to whoever wants them, and to organize work
that needs to be done. Such work should be socially useful and
environmentally low impact: from child care to teaching and
research, to elder care to conservation to arts and culture. Where
possible, it should contribute to global public and knowledge
goods. It should compete as little as possible with work normally
done in the private sector; for instance, by serving those who
cannot afford private sector provision of teaching and care. The
point is not to socialize the economy but to expand the range of
useful activity, so that what needs doing in society actually gets
done. The barrier to all this is simply a matter of politics and
organization, not of money.
The effect, nevertheless, would be to raise all private sector
wages to the buffer-stock minimum (say, $8/hour in the United
States), while eliminating the reserve of unemployed used to
depress wages in low-skilled private sector industries. There will
be no pressure to raise wages above the buffer threshold, since pri-
vate employers providing higher wages can draw on anindefinitely
large workforce willing, for the most part, to move from the
buffer to the private sector in return for those wages. Hence, the
program is not inflationary. There is therefore no excuse for wait-
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periods and of evaluating the results against the goals and objec-
tives. They will require a national and transnational planning
framework, embedded in institutions at the highest levels of gov-
ernment, including ministries in Europe and cabinet depart-
ments in the United States.
Banking and finance can play a role in the achievement of
these objectives—but only if the regulation to which they are
subject directs them toward that public purpose. The group thus
turned to a discussion of how best to achieve that goal.
Toward a Functional System of Banking and Finance
The breakdown of the global banking system has activated an
instinct to repair. Banks and other powerful financial players
want the world returned to the condition that existed before the
crash. Governments, responding to political pressure as well as
the threat of cataclysmic economic failure, do as the financial
players want them to do. The results are always disappointing.
The problem is partly that the system cannot be put back to as it
was and partly that it should not be. As one participant stated,
“Humpty Dumpty was an egg.”
A central dilemma of globalization is that finance escapes
from national systems of regulation far more easily than any
other activity. It is in the nature of financial transactions that
they can be relocated instantly, and often clandestinely, in order
to avoid the scrutiny of regulators.
Thus, the problem of effective financial regulation starts
with the problem of borders. As matters stand, even where nom-
inally operating as overseas branches banking institutions are
effectively broken into subsidiaries, each operating under local
rules, each accounting to the standards of the local authorities,
and between them taking advantage of every form of tax and
regulatory arbitrage. The result is an effective escape from taxa-
tion and a substantial escape from regulation. One participant
described the existing program of international cooperation in
bank regulation as “catastrophic,” and the Basel I, Basel II, and
Financial Stability Forum approaches as a “collection of fig leaves.”
Hopes for an effective international safety-and-soundness
regime are frustrated by national political considerations.
Countries that provide tax and regulatory havens benefit at the
expense of their neighbors. Countries housing major financial
markets refuse cooperation so as not to lose competitiveness with
other contending centers. The multinational banks form lobbies
pressing for least-common-denominator regulation, and these are
will cure itself, and every reason to believe that at the end of such
a policy of “hopeful waiting,” the discovery will be made that the
problem has not been cured.
Moving on to the problem of global public goods, it is clear
that the neoliberal concept of reform—the creation of market
mechanisms—is the dominant approach to the problem of cli-
mate change at the present time. The Paris group was largely rec-
onciled, or perhaps resigned, to the cap-and-trade approach to
marketable carbon permits presently moving through the U.S.
Congress and enshrined in the international agreements. However,
the weakness of this approach is highly apparent, in at least three
important respects:
First, from the outset the market is compromised by exemp-
tions for agriculture, lax treatment of coal, and the potential for
speculative manipulation of permit prices. Tightening of cover-
age and regulation of the conduct of major market players will
have to be high on the agenda once the basic framework is in place.
Second, taken by itself, the approach is likely to engender a
violent political backlash, as it provides consumers with eco-
nomic incentives to adjust their behavior but not readily avail-
able and low-cost means of doing so. If income effects therefore
dominate, so that people feel impoverished by the requirements
pressing on them, then the price of dealing with climate change
will come to seem, to many people, too high.
Third, an auction mechanism implies a variable price, which
increases the uncertainty associated with long-term investment
and technological change. So long as the permit price has the
potential to fall as well as to rise, the profitability of low-carbon
investment is questionable, and the amount provided will likely
be too small.
The solution to this problem can only be to plan and to
invest in the creation of appropriate design, engineering, and
technological solutions to the greenhouse gas problem, and to
do so in a way that is independent of the short-term profit
motive. Such planning and investment are necessarily public
functions that will not be provided optimally by any market
mechanism.
They will require the inception of new-knowledge goods—
planning frameworks for energy sustainability at the local and
regional level—that will in turn require a large-scale reorienta-
tion/expansion of educational and research resources. They will
require the creation of a long-term financing network—such as
the National Infrastructure Fund long proposed for the United
States—capable of sustaining capital investment activity for longThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 11
effective partly because they can dominate national political sys-
tems and partly because they can play one government off against
another. International institutions are weak and excessively mar-
ket oriented, placing automatic cushions—specifically, capital
requirements—at the heart of the regulatory framework. As they
supervise the result, they invariably find that financial institutions
are well capitalized—until the day that those institutions fail.
Compared to Basel I, the Basel II framework for banking
reduced capital requirements and increased the incentive to rely on
ratings agencies, which in turn were allowed to use proprietary
models to deliver AAA ratings to private securities, on a fee-for-
service basis. This was a formula for producing biased ratings,
essentially amounting to ratings fraud, on a global scale. The
increased leverage that accompanied the explosion in the securi-
ties markets increased the fragility of the institutions, which they
attempted to offset, in part, by buying credit default swaps. The
effect of this was to vector risk throughout the system, in ways that
could not be traced or anticipated by the authorities, so that a seri-
ous event in one part of the system could become a catastrophe,
arriving from any azimuth at any time. And, with the collapse of
Lehman Brothers, the catastrophe arrived. It was vectored, as it
happened, to AIG via the latter’s financial products division, a
small unit based in London and apparently operating beyond the
control or supervision of the firm’s senior management. And the
collapse of AIG brought on a panic that disrupted and came close
to destroying the institutional basis of the global financial system.
The response of the system to the panic was to nationalize
the provision of liquidity and to absorb the shadow banking sys-
tem into the state. That is the meaning of the expansion of
deposit insurance, the effective guarantees placed behind money
market funds, and the taking of commercial paper wholesale
onto the balance sheets of the central banks. As Perry Mehrling
pointed out, the effect of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan
Facility (TALF) was to make the Federal Reserve into a de facto
investment bank. Meanwhile, the solvency problems of the banks
proper are being overlooked, while the government infuses them
with cash. A logical next step, Mehrling argued, is for the gov-
ernment to take over the function of providing credit insurance,
and to do so for an appropriate fee. In practice, it appears that the
Federal Reserve, through its program of nonrecourse lending
against risky collateral, is providing a kind of on-balance-sheet
version of the AIG credit default swaps.
All of this is to be expected. When things go badly, it is
national governments that are called upon to intervene. The
problem of liquidity can be solved only at the level of the cur-
rency unit, which (except in Europe) is a national issue. Dollars,
in the final analysis, can be supplied only by the Federal Reserve;
euros, only by the European Central Bank. So long as the under-
lying conditions persist, the position of government in financial
matters cannot be dispensed with.
How long will the underlying conditions persist? When will
come the moment when things will “return to normal” and the
status quo ante will be restored? Or, to put the question more
pointedly, Will there ever come such a moment? Current discus-
sion of “exit strategies” for government involvement in finance
indicates that governments, the banks themselves, and the finan-
cial press are eager to put the recent round of interventions
behind them, evading, among other things, the restrictions and
scrutiny to which they have been subjected. The question is, Can
they do so? Will they ever be able to do so?
The Paris group spent considerable time on the character of
improved or ideal systems, going back to Keynes’s 1944 concep-
tion of a world clearing unit of account, and to the postwar sys-
tem of strictly regulated banks and stable interest rates. Yet there
was general agreement that the past cannot be re-created, because
the particular conditions of technology, communication, and the
global balance of power that characterized life two generations
ago cannot be reproduced. By similar argument, the more recent
past also cannot be re-created. The basic reason is that the par-
ticular institutions that imparted a false sense of stability and
apparent trustworthiness to that system have been destroyed: not
merely damaged, but destroyed. Their names and forms may per-
sist, with deposit insurance, guarantees, and public capital prop-
ping up the roofs. But the functions and activities of the precrisis
period cannot be reproduced in the postcrisis atmosphere, and
this fact will become increasingly clear as time passes.
The Paris group therefore sees no alternative to the perma-
nent restoration of national or equivalent public power (in the
case of the EU, European power) over all financial institutions.
Banks are public-private partnerships, funded partly at public
risk (via deposit insurance and implicit guarantees). They can-
not logically operate independently of the power that guaran-
tees their funding, and the attempt to allow them to do so is
intrinsically destabilizing.
Once having extended deposit insurance, governments can-
not remove it. The attempt to return to a pre-insurance world, by
allowing the value of accounts covered by insurance to erode, as
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tutions. Rules for banks, such as: thou shalt not maintain shell
corporations, off-balance-sheet special purpose vehicles, con-
duct business in specified tax havens, or engage in proprietary
trading, or establish compensation rules that encourage looting.
Rules of taxation, stipulating that national taxes shall be in pro-
portion to the national share of global corporate income,
whether booked in the country or not. Rules for mortgages,
returning mortgage finance to its public purpose, which is to sta-
bilize households and communities. And rules for citizens, such
as, one may not structure or restructure a corporation for the
purpose of evading tax or regulation in one’s own country.
In the case of credit default swaps, there is a strong argu-
ment for the position that they be banned outright, or simply
declared unenforceable. Short of that, rules should stipulate that
they are not enforceable unless written with standard terms and
traded on an open exchange.
The difficulty of writing and enforcing appropriate rules of
this type is evident. Doing so, however, remains the only serious
antidote to reckless finance.
Enforcement is essential. The crisis originated in one of the
great financial frauds of history, the issuance and securitization
of subprime and Alt-A mortgages that were designed to gener-
ate fee income on origination, leaving the originators with no
incentive to monitor loan quality. Fraud and misrepresentation
were not merely epidemic, not merely rampant: they were per-
vasive. The failure of market-based solutions to the toxic asset
problem can be traced to this fact; independent investors realize
this, and therefore know that these assets are permanently
impaired. So long as the financial system is not thoroughly
purged of those responsible for financial crimes—through inves-
tigation and prosecution before the law—the system itself will
not regain credibility, nor the trust of domestic or international
clients. It makes no sense to repair the system merely to allow
the same players to return to their posts.
It follows that the group favors a major strengthening of inde-
pendent audit and enforcement capabilities in the regulatory agen-
cies. This is an issue of staff, resources, and leadership, first and
foremost. But it is also an issue of knowledge and capability. The
regulatory agencies need useful expertise. They need criminolo-
gists as much as—perhaps more than—they need economists.
The ultimate result of applying this perspective to the
redesign of financial systems would be twofold. First, it would
largely reconcentrate financial activity in banks—which is to say,
in chartered and regulated public or public-private institutions,
to the reproduction of conditions for panic—as happened with
Northern Rock. Similarly, in the United States, the perception in
September 2008 that some banks were too big to fail while oth-
ers were not led to a flight from the latter to the former—even
though it was large banks, not small ones, that were responsible
for the conditions leading to collapse.
So, too, in the shadow banking system. Money market
mutual funds functioned free of formal government guarantees
so long as it was widely believed that they were perfectly liquid
and could not “break the buck.” The crisis shattered that belief.
Placing government guarantees behind the funds effectively
turned them into narrow banks. This situation cannot now be
reversed. And while the proportion of commercial paper held by
the central bank may rise or fall with economic conditions going
forward, the fact that the central bank has shown that it will sup-
port the commercial paper market has permanent effects. It
affects the credibility of that market, and it creates new condi-
tions for the issuance of commercial paper and the assessment of
its creditworthiness. A similar situation holds with central bank
backing for collateralized debt obligations and mortgage-backed
securities. Similarly again, the collapse of confidence in the rat-
ings agencies has permanent effects: it raises a doubt, whether
well founded or not in any particular case, as to the credibility of
an investment-grade rating.
Nor will the problem be solved by increasing capital require-
ments. The idea that bank risk taking can be effectively limited by
capital requirements is a neoliberal illusion, stemming directly
from the concepts of perfect information (banks’ proprietary
models calculate rationally the optimal risk to take) and market
discipline (ratings agencies give honest and unbiased ratings.) In
reality, capital requirements are neither a barrier to risk taking nor
a cushion against losses. They are a tax on the operation of insti-
tutions, a source of conflict with the desire to promote credit
expansion, and a “conduit to insolvency,” as one speaker put it, as
declining valuations wipe out the cushion for individual institu-
tions and increase the pressure on the system as a whole. Yet the
problem is not to tax risk or size in general, but to minimize finan-
cial behaviors that are likely to bring down the system. The plain
lesson of history is that this can only be achieved by national (or
transnational) regulation of institutional behavior.
Therefore, the task of governments going forward is not to
find exit strategies that permit a return to the status quo ante. It
is to establish and enforce effective rules for institutions operat-
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with defined functions aligned with public purpose. Thus, it
would shrink the shadow banking system. (This result can be
further assured by requiring the registration of nonbank entities
and subjecting them to oversight as appropriate.) Second, it
would align the reach of particular banks with the regulatory
frontiers applicable to that bank, ending the reach of banks into
countries and regions that cannot control their activities. These
steps would permit examination regimes to inspect the full range
of a bank’s activities, reducing the scale of unregulated specula-
tionsand making it easier to detect and prosecute fraud. Together,
they would begin to change the culture of the financial sector,
promoting a more conservative, less predatory, and less reckless
approach to financial services.
A further advantage of this approach is that, within banking,
it would tend to shrink the largest and most transnational bank-
ing institutions relative to smaller, national and regional banks.
In a financial sector that is destined in any event to shrink, rela-
tive to the economy, in the postcrisis period, a crucial policy
question is, Which institutions should shrink by the most? The
group generally took the view that extreme bigness in banks con-
veys no technical, competitive, or national advantages. Banks are
legal institutions, in the sense that they exist largely to write
financial contracts. Big international banks exist largely to take
advantage of differences in national tax regimes, accounting
standards, and regulations, and to exercise political power. Theirs
is an example of institutional evolution adapted to private, not
public, purpose, and the object of a structured downsizing
should be to achieve a structure that is aligned to public purpose:
a universe of stable, numerous, competitive institutions that can be
regulated effectively and that are individually not too big to fail.
Where there may exist “critical system infrastructure”
presently administered by large banks, there is no reason why
such infrastructure should not be managed in the public sector,
as a public utility. The possession of such infrastructure is not
per se a reason to keep an otherwise failed or failing institution
alive. “Too big to fail,” in other words, should be considered a
temporary condition. Once a company is designated, under
President Obama’s plan, a “Tier One Financial Holding Company,”
the task of policy should be to shrink and simplify that company
to the point where it no longer poses a distinct risk to the system.
Clearly, the place to start would be with undersupervised inter-
national divisions of the largest banks.
Transnational companies would thenceforward seek funding
for local activities in the local banking system. Since many coun-
tries are below the scale of efficient banking operations, this con-
sequence implies a boost for the ongoing process of regional mon-
etary management. This process is most advanced in Europe, but
it is emerging as well in Asia and in Latin America. The Paris group
regards this development as a positive step, on the whole. It raises
the question, however, of what larger monetary environment best
suits the functioning of a parapublic credit system.
International Monetary Reform Still to Come
In the final session, the Paris group turned to a discussion of the
international monetary system writ large.
The first lesson of international monetary systems in the
20th century, from the gold standard through Bretton Woods
and after, is that they do not last forever. For nearly 40 years, since
President Nixon closed the gold window, the world has accepted
a de facto dollar standard. Reliance on the dollar actually grew
stronger in the past decade, as many countries built dollar
reserves in order to combat the volatilities the Asian and Russian
crises revealed the system to be capable of. But there is no reason
for a feeling of confidence that this arrangement will endure.
Some members of the group suspect that the U.S. origins of
the present crisis will lead to reconsideration of the dollar’s
supremacy fairly soon. Others believe that the inertia of the sys-
tem is strong, and that the absence of a credible alternative—
notwithstanding the euro—will keep the dollar at the center of
the world system for some time. (All agreed that if an unplanned-
for change comes, the transition costs are likely to be high—as
they were in the interwar period.) In spite of differences on this
question of the medium-term outlook, the group was agreed that
the current system has both defects and vulnerabilities, and that
a better system could and should be designed.
The principal vulnerability of the dollar-based system lies
in the fact that the main justifications for it no longer exist. The
dollar anchored the exchange system sanctified at Bretton Woods
because of the United States’ dominant economic position in the
postwar world. In the 1990s, the development of an asymmetric
system rooted in dollar reserves was an outgrowth of the power
of American financial interests in the world economy, of the
Keynesian character of the American system that gave the United
States a tendency toward strong demand policies and permanent
current account deficits, of the fact that China’s opening toward
the West initially relied heavily on American markets, and of resid-
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in the first instance to help deal with the crisis in Central and
Eastern Europe. This initiative raises a serious question as to the
role of the IMF.
The group’s assessment of the IMF is, essentially, that it is
beyond repair. As one participant pointed out, the organization
exists outside the framework of law, and routinely violates its
own charter, with impunity, particularly in denying to member
states the right to impose control over capital flows. Members
have the right, under the charter, to demand reduction in terms
of repayment—yet the IMF and the World Bank routinely seek
to set themselves apart, as creditors preferred above all others.
Conditionality and austerity are imposed on the most vulnera-
ble member countries, with the objective of undermining the
most basic human economic rights, under conditions that pre-
clude effective economic recovery. Adding funds and power to
this organization is an exercise in self-defeat. As one participant
put it, “The concept of a reformed IMF is an oxymoron.” The
prevalent view within the group is that efforts to expand the
resources of the IMF should be defeated.
In an ideal world, clearing away the present dysfunctional
international monetary institutions would open a path toward a
reformed system, in which the function of an international
reserve currency would be, not the financing of temporary cur-
rent account deficits (followed by adjustment), but the provision
of resources to support the development of the nontraded and,
especially, the nonprofit sectors in countries that cannot sus-
tainably finance their own current account deficits. Thus, an
international system would support critical infrastructure, envi-
ronmental protection and greenhouse gas reduction, public
health, education, and research, creating zones of economic sta-
bility and supporting development and high employment.
Rather than forcing developing countries to find ever more
exports in order to invest and expand, the goal would be to free
developing countries from a compulsive need to serve the export
sector on any terms. However, the emergence of new global insti-
tutions governed on progressive and humane principles remains
a distant objective.
The final alternative to a single-reserve-asset world is to pur-
sue the development of regional monetary authorities, which
can, among other things, make dollar reserve assets earned by
countries that are successful net exporters available to neighbors
who are not. Such authorities have distinct advantages over a global
system, because (1) the regional fund has a direct stake in the
success of member countries under its authority, (2) a structured
position through the end of the Cold War. Of these facts, only
the second remains a compelling reason for the system to con-
tinue—and it amounts to saying that the dollar reserve system
depends basically on the United States being the country most
willing to run large trade deficits. This cannot be a secure foun-
dation for a permanent system.
The issues of “asymmetry” and “imbalance” were raised and
discussed, with some participants arguing that a system based
on the financial assets of a single country is inherently unstable.
Others were not confident of this conclusion: whether the system
is symmetric or asymmetric depends on whether there are
economiesand advantages to having assets denominated in a sin-
gle currency serve as the world’s reserve. If so, the country
favored by reserve status must adapt: its exchange will be bid to
the point where imports exceed exports by the amount that the
rest of the world wishes to hold in reserve. In a growing world
economy this will always be a positive sum, and in a converging
world economy (with poorer countries growing more rapidly
than the reserve-asset country) it will normally lead to a current
account deficit that increases as a share of the reserve-asset sup-
plier’s GDP. As Ping Chen put it, the world economy is always
asymmetric. The question is, Does there come a point where con-
siderations in favor of sticking with the single reserve currency are
outweighed by reasons to change the system?
There are three logical alternatives to the dollar-based sys-
tem. The first is that the dollar might be replaced by another key
currency, as the pound sterling was replaced by the dollar (out-
side the sterling bloc) from the 1920s through the 1940s. The
euro is now the key contender for the replacement role. However,
for the euro to mount a sustained challenge, several conditions
would have to be met. First, the eurozone would have to begin to
run substantial current account deficits, creating the net asset out-
flows that are the counterpart of reserve accumulation. European
policy is averse to running demand at that level. Second, the
European Union would need to develop a reserve asset enjoying
the full faith and credit of the union itself, not merely national
bonds denominated in euros. Third, the United States would have
to embark on a policy of much greater austerity, basically renounc-
ing recovery from the great crisis—a possibility that the Paris
group was not prepared to contemplate for the moment.
The second possibility is the replacement of the dollar by a
new international reserve asset—the revival and expansion of
the special drawing right (SDR). Note was taken of the G-20
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systemgives small countries some of the advantages and margin for
maneuver that are already enjoyed by large economies in both the
developed and developing worlds, and (3) regional power can be
deployed effectively over regional financial institutions.
In this respect, developments in Europe, Asia, and Latin
America in the past decade are encouraging. The euro remains
the leading example of international monetary integration; the
task before Europe is to extend the protections of membership in
the euro system to the rapidly deflating economies of the East; to
develop mechanisms to help build demand by transferring
resources effectively to the poorer member economies, permit-
ting the quick establishment of employment programs; and to
restore effective regulation of finance at the continental level.
Asia and Latin America have the capacity to achieve quali-
tatively comparable results if they choose to do so. In this way,
some of the asymmetries associated with a single reserve asset
can be remedied—especially the fact that large parts of the world,
unable to earn adequate hard currency, cannot finance develop-
ment at all.
To put the matter another way, the problem of asymmetry
is the problem of assuring sufficient aggregate effective demand
in the world economy to permit the full utilization of human
resources—while conserving, as much as possible, nonrenewable
and environmental resources. The way forward toward this goal
is, in the first instance, to put resources at the disposal of coun-
tries, regions, and households that have been starved for such
resources over the neoliberal era. The United States can (and
will) continue to supply the main global reserve asset, running a
trade deficit to match. But it would be highly desirable to supply
additional reserves, and hence to fund additional activity
demand, through an alternative asset, channeled mainly through
regional institutions and deployed mainly in the not-for-profit
and nontraded-goods sectors.
In brief conclusion, the group of experts convened in Paris in
June warns that the crisis is not over, that policies so far set in
motion are not sufficient, and that the goals set by the authorities
to this point, which amount to a restoration of previous condi-
tions, are neither desirable nor possible. It is time to take account
of the irreversible characteristics of recent events, to chart a course
of new construction instead of reconstruction, and to build the
domestic and financial monetary institutions and safeguards nec-
essary to make it possible to pursue that course.
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